forward by ira millstein
In the last 10 years, many governance reforms have come to pass. The S&P 500 now have predominantly independent boards, CEO and CFO accountability for financial reports and full Audit Committee oversight of financials. A fresh series of changes are flowing from the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and Securities and Exchange Commission rules. For instance, corporations publicly listed in the US must for the first time provide explanations to shareholders about their board leadership structure as well as their reasons for separating or combining the Chair and CEO titles.
With this backdrop, more US companies than ever appear to have moved to a separate Chair model. Spencer Stuart reports that, in 2010, 40% of the S&P 500 now feature separate Chairs, up from 23% at the beginning of the decade. Of the 40%, 19% may be classified as independent Chairs, up from 9% five years ago. Booz Allen's research on CEO succession reports that, in the US, only 16.5% of incoming 2009 CEOs had both the CEO and Chair title, a much lower number than 2000, when about half the incoming CEOs occupied both positions.
As separate board leadership becomes more prevalent, the Chairmen's Forum -a group of independent Chairs at corporations in the US and Canada-turned its attention to how to make the Chair role work -and in the case of this report, how the Chair and CEO can work effectively together. With more firms having a leadership structure that includes a nonexecutive Chair and a CEO, we need to understand what that relationship is all about. And one way to shed light on the topic is to tap the experiences of those who have served in those roles at public companies. What constitutes a good relationship? What should be the basic framework of the relationship? What are good practices and what approaches are unproductively risky? Are there specific features that might predict problems? And, if there are such early indicators of trouble, what are some of the ways to get a relationship back on track? A well-constructed relationship between a CEO and a non-executive Chair can create value -for investors, customers, employees and the community. Gaining insight on how those partnerships can thrive-and what can make them fail-is of urgent relevance to Chairs, CEOs, boards and investors.
Past practice provides little guidance. There are no books of etiquette or protocol addressing North American conditions that can guide a Chair or CEO to the "right" answer and, clearly, each relationship is as unique as the two people who are in it. Therefore, our goal is to understand what constitutes a winning relationship between two individuals, each successful in his or her own right.
To better understand this challenge, the Chairmen's Forum cooperated to sponsor research into the nature of a successful Chair-CEO relationship. Dr. Elise Walton, an established management expert, conducted thirty five interviews with Chairs, CEOs and stakeholders. The findings discussed in this paper distill their insights from boardroom experience. Note that this working paper reflects the views of the author and not those of the Millstein Center, Yale School of Management or Yale University.
-Ira Millstein is Senior Associate Dean for Corporate Governance at the Yale School of Management 3 i. introduction
This paper examines the role of the corporate Chair in the context of one of the most important relationships the Chair has -his or her relationship with the company's CEO. To approach the topic, the Chairmen's Forum sponsored a research effort to interview experienced Chairs, CEOs and stakeholders. After the Forum agreed on the project, a research plan was designed and approved by the sponsors. Key interview questions and interview candidates were reviewed and approved. The main areas of the interview included: background experience with the two roles; successful situations and what worked; challenges and what didn't work; how a relationship develops over time; and recommendations.
After the interviews were conducted, comments were analyzed for common themes and ideas, as well as areas where opinions clearly diverged. Themes were grouped into major topic areas. Three areas describe conditions for an effective working relationship: Chemistry, Framework and Context. A fourth area reflected the value of an effective working relationship, and the fifth covered recommendations for how to improve Chair-CEO effectiveness more generally. A preliminary draft was shared with the Chairmen's Forum in November 2010 for comment and review. Participants shared reactions and comments for a revised paper.
The report and stories herein reflect knowledge and practice in North America at a point in time and, as such, it attempts to contribute to the development and evolution of knowledge and practice in the culture of board leadership. It should not be understood to represent timeless, empirical truths; rather, it has the potential to help in development of guidelines and insights for those working with current and real challenges today.
ii. the chemistry of the chair-ceo relationship
In discussing the nature of the Chair-CEO relationship, the first thoughts offered by CEOs and Chairs on what makes for an effective relationship are broad words like "chemistry," trust, respect, confidence. These high level descriptions convey a general feel of the relationship. But what are the specifics of the relationships that work? What are the elements that make up this "good chemistry"-and can they be replicated?
The factors that emerged from interviews and discussion were several -communications, consideration, professionalism and individual characteristics. By far, the most noted contributor to good chemistry was good communications. Good communication is the fabric for creating and sustaining the right tone of the relationship.
However, since the definition of "good communication" can vary from person to person, it is important to explore what "good communication" looks like in the boardroom. Said one non-executive Chair: "communication -that's such an easy thing to say and such a hard thing to do."
In probing beyond the headline, some common characteristics of good communication emerged.
Frequent and Open Communications.
Most Chairs and CEOs said they communicated regularly -a couple times a week -with their counterpart, particularly at the onset of the relationship. The most common cadence was weekly, with the highest frequency being daily interaction and some reporting a monthly frequency.
Most important was that the communication should be "open."
The term open was used to express qualities of communication like direct, unrestrained, informal -the sense that either party can and will say what is on their mind. Said one director, "It's important to be tactful and consider how to approach sensitive issues, but it's equally important to be direct. And most times you'll find that the other guy is well aware of the issue."
Another Chair described dealing with an issue as his discomfort rose.
I felt that we were seeing numbers that didn't tell the full story, and that the CEO wasn't being completely open. I had a sense that the numbers were being managed around compensation goals. I scheduled a lunch with the CEO and raised the issue directly. I wasn't 4 completely satisfied with his answers, but now he knows it's on my mind and he knows what I want to see. (Non-executive Chair)
The ability to have this direct conversation was essential; and Chairs and CEOs alike felt that few circumstances warranted less than full transparency.
Further, open and frequent communication had some specific qualities, listed below.
Communication frequency follows circumstance. Communications often started off at a higher frequency progressing to more consistent, but less frequent, communications as the pair built a shared understanding of issues and options. Said one Chair: Communication is purposeful. Non-executive Chairs, in particular, noted that they made an intentional effort to stay in touch with the CEO. First, that meant setting aside dedicated time to work with the CEO. For one Chair, that meant flying to the opposite coast and working there for one week per month. For another Chair, it meant onsite meetings once a week. For a third, it meant scheduling a monthly lunch -at either his workplace or the company. All Chairs specifically planned for time with the CEO -it wasn't left to chance. Second, both Chairs and CEOs had an agenda to work on -in some cases, the agenda might cover longer term strategic topics, in other cases it could be specifics of dealing with issues before the board. But the planned time together was put to good use.
One part of purposeful communications is ensuring that time spent together is focused and productive. Another part of purposeful communications is ensuring that conversations are not unnecessary or outside the scope of the board's role. Chairs worked hard to be respectful of management time and not to take up time unnecessarily. Most Chairs paid close attention to what they were covering with management, being sure that it fell within the board prerogatives and did not impinge on management's role. One Chair said, "I always ask myself -'do I need to know this? Is this a board responsibility?' before I make a request to the CEO."
Communication takes many venues. While planned meetings were an important part of the communications, many of the exchanges were "pick up the phone" type of communication.
One Chair said that he emails the CEO a few times a week. Another Chair and CEO emailed daily as the corporation dealt with an unsolicited bid -email headline: "Catching Up."
Chairs and CEOs felt this informal, staying-in-touch communication was essential. There should be no hindrance or hesitation to reach out and share a thought. Where good communications between the Chair and CEO is absent, problems emerge with board communications.
In Their Own Words…
building the management team "The board was pleased with getting such a great CEO. We hired him particularly because he had a great track record with people and we knew he would be able to build a team capable of taking our growing consumer products company to the next level. Nine months into his tenure, the board had to make some compensation decisions, and struggled over some continuing executives. Unfortunately, one decision blew up. We had made a recommendation on an executive's compensation and the CEO was not happy. The CEO was so unhappy that he wrote an email to the full board sharing his personal and professional frustration. In all, he thought the board had acted disrespectfully by making a decision without consulting him. I see it a little differently -I think we did consult with him and inform him, but we had a continuing difference of opinion and finally it was time to act. From our perspective, this executive was in a key position -Chief Marketing Officer (CMO). Several directors had deep marketing experiences and they knew what to look for. For a consumer products company, the CMO has to deliver marketing vision and effectiveness, and we didn't see it. I understand opinions differ, and maybe the CEO was looking for a different contribution than the board expected, but we saw an issue that wasn't being heard.
After the incident, the CEO and I sat down to talk -with plenty of time to discuss concerns and frustrations. This was a trigger issue for the CEO. He shared a few reactions. One, his frustration that the board went over in executive session time -with people waiting, knowing the topic, it was awkward. Two, he felt his time got short shrift, and he was unable to share some of the plans he had for the CMO, on talent development and backup. I shared the board's view: that he was somewhat defensive of the individual.
In all, it was a good conversation and we agreed to ask a small group (General Counsel, VP HR, and the Compensation Committee Chair) to outline a better, more formal process for talent review. We also agreed that the CEO would be more proactive in sharing his talent-management plans, even informally, and that the board would work on managing time more effectively to avoid the delays to his team. In the end, we'll have a better process and we'll continue to improve our relationship. But, it all started with just sitting down to listen.
Several months later, the CMO left of his own accord, and the board approved the group's recommendations on talent review. In all, we put together a strong process for building the management team -a top priority for the business." 6 2.
Reciprocity and Consideration. Finally, in looking at the characteristics of the two individuals, there is some benefit to status equivalence. That is, the accomplishments of one should seem roughly equivalent to the accomplishment of the other. They need not be identical in venue or level, but if there is a sense that one player is not in the same league as the other, that can cause problems.
Having the fundamentals of good chemistry is a start, but other factors support and maintain that chemistry. Functional aspects of the relationship can incite unproductive conflict or facilitate productive problem solving. To understand how these help or hurt, we cover the elements of the framework that participants consider important.
iii. having a clear framework
Having a clear framework -including a common sense of purpose and direction, clear roles, and effective processes -is an important component for successful Chair-CEO relationships. The framework is built by clear communications and good chemistry, but the reverse is also true: the right framework helps build strong communications and trust. The elements of the framework are elaborated below.
Shared Commitment to Corporate Well-being.
When looking across many factors, the underlying commitment to the company was paramount as a common feature of successful Chair-CEO relationships. This was the focus that allowed the board and management to work through differences, and for the Chair and CEO to partner effectively.
We both know that, at the end of the day, we're both here to serve the corporation and its shareholders. And, some day that might mean he's not the right guy for the job anymore, or I'm not the right guy for the job -but either way, we both share the view that it's not about us, it's about the business. (Non-executive Chair)
In the successful cases, the commitment was more than just to doing the right thing for the company and its shareholders, but that there was a common sense of how to achieve that goal. Most Chairs expected management to take the lead in proposing strategy, tactics, and targets, although they wanted to ensure board views and suggestions got their appropriate due. However, it was important that the Chair felt that, overall, management strategies were intelligent, had a good prospect of success and could be explained to shareholders if that became required. Issues about a specific action, target, or acquisition were thoroughly vetted and the underlying logic agreed. The ability to discuss and debate strategy led to a deeper understanding of the business propositions and logic.
There was also a keen alignment around goals and targets, and that the strategies and goals represented an objective effort for what was in the best interests of the company. Said one Chair:
I don't see how you could have a Chair and CEO who had two different and separate ideas for the company. That company would be strategically rudderless. This alignment is very important -if the Chair and the CEO don't agree on some big strategic issues and choices, you'll waste a lot of time. (Non-executive Chair)
In Their Own Words… merger of equals "The CEO and I worked really closely on the merger -we went to meetings together, we talked about what kind of analysis we needed, what decisions needed to be made. We bounced ideas off of each other. But we were very explicit about involving the whole board -the merger had to be a full-board effort, not just a Chair-CEO project. We agreed we'd both listen to the board's ideas and concerns, and we had a very open and transparent process. Having come out of bankruptcy, we had a lot of banker types on the board, and we were sensitive to creditors' concerns, but there was no question that we were both committed to building the best company in the business" -(Non-executive Chair -Acquired Company)
"I worked closely with my CEO and that was a benefit. But so did the Chair and CEO of the acquired company. So we had two lines of communication -Chair to Chair and CEO to CEO. That worked well, because we do tend to bring a different lens to the problem. For instance, the CEOs took a strong look at cash flow -a very important concern in our industry. Us Chairs were concerned with some of the more strategic, long-term issues like the final design of the company -what assets should be jettisoned, who should lead the new company, compensation issues and what the governance model would be. Some of these are tough decisions -especially when you have employees who have devoted their lives to working for your brand. On some of these, the CEO is conflicted -you can't expect a CEO to approach certain decisions impartially. We got to tough decisions on names, locations, structure, because we had confidence in each other. In the end, the combined firm got to better decisions because we had both the Chairs and the CEOs actively involved in the merger process." (Non-executive Chair -Acquiring Company)
At the most basic level, if either party is seen as pursuing personal agendas -for wealth or power -that is a clear red flag.
Strategic alignment is a necessary condition for success. It can be critical when making big decisions (see Merger of Equals and Aligning on Strategy inserts).
Defined but Adaptable Roles.
Chairs and CEOs agree: The CEO runs the company, the Chair runs the board. That is the basic starting point for all discussion. The matters for board consideration are the basics of strategy, performance, and succession, but usually extend to mergers and acquisitions, material financial decisions (capital expenditures, stock buybacks, financing deals), as well as approval and monitoring of the annual budget and plan.
Effective relationships involved some upfront discussion about roles. One Chair used a role matrix from governance publications, going through the line items sequentially to gain clarity on who would do what. Another Chair described being "interviewed" by the CEO before taking the position:
It was clear that the CEO didn't think I was a perfect match for the Chair position because I don't have the usual background for the role. But at the same time, I didn't have any complicating issues. I think, really, what he really wanted to know is if I wanted to be CEO or be Chair, so we spent a lot of time talking about the distinction between the CEO and Chair's position. (Chair)
But moving beyond the manage the board/manage the company headline, differences emerge. For instance, a few Chairs make a habit of meeting with stakeholders -investors primarily. One Chair devoted extra time to two major shareholders that sat on the board, but didn't reach out to other investors beyond the directors. Other Chairs avoided any interaction with investors or the investment community, with one going so far as to indicate that he would not feel ready (one year into the role) to represent the company's financial status or results to investors. Some attended management functions -a Chair's award event, an occasional employee meeting, a senior team meeting; others did not. The common denominator across these differences: the activity set was acknowledged and understood by both the Chair and the CEO as areas for Chair engagement.
Thus, there are not hard and fast common rules across practice, but general rules clearly elaborated into specific, well understood practices.
To work out mutual roles, a few suggestions were made. First, complementary skills and approaches may make the working relationship smoother. One Chair commented that the CEO often brings urgent, shorter-horizon work to the board; and that the Chair provided a counterbalancing longer-term orientation. Conversely, the CEO, who described himself as "immersed in the day-to-day," valued his Chair bringing biggerpicture perspective to the conversations. The same would be true in the area of business skills -if one individual knows the insurance business, while the other knows marketing, it's easy to know who will take the lead on problem solving in those respective areas. Where the skills are complementary and trust is high, it may be effective to divide the leadership initiatives.
Where the expertise is overlapping with the CEO, the Chair will need to put in the time to ensure that the two are of common mind. While the board's concerns caused some friction, the good relationships among the CEO, the Chair, and the board members led to an effective, positive, replicable solution: the board and the CEO outlined the standard template of information that would be provided to the board for acquisitions the board needed to approve. This provided management with a clear idea of what information they would be asked for, and required to prepare. Further, it removed the unpleasant task from the board of having to send back proposals for more information. Overall, the decision process moved more quickly.
(For a similar story, see insert Building the Acquisition Process.)
A second area was around specific Chair assignments, or dual roles, which could cause role conflict. One Chair reflected on a Chair-CEO pairing that didn't work well: These comments illuminate an important aspect of the Chair role -the Chair is not the boss of the CEO. The board has authority over the CEO, and the Chair manages the board, so the Chair, indirectly, has formal authority over the CEO. Chairs, however, generally want it to be clear that they do not intend to manage the CEO, in the traditional sense of the word.
While acknowledging the need for Committee Chairs to lead some of the board's tasks, the Chair does retain an overall role in coordinating the CEO evaluation and feedback processes, and, generally, as board leader, the Chair delivers the feedback to the CEO on year-end performance.
Effective Processes.
Having processes that allowed for engagement, debate, and true decision making was important. These processes may develop in response to issues that emerged, or they may have been pre-existing. The cited benefit of processes was the ability to manage opinions and build alignment effectively.
Chair-director communication.
Communications should include formal and informal venues, be open, be regular -and multi-lateral. As with the CEO, effective Chairs communicated frequently with other directors. Some organized one-on-ones by phone or otherwise, others built it into an ongoing assessment process, and still others used travel time ("the airport lounge") for communications. The "staying in touch" process creates the context -it allows the Chair to keep his or her finger on the pulse of the board, to be sensitive to opinions and issues that need attention. Regular communication helps the Chair know what issues are on people's minds, it helps him or her be more effective in facilitating good discussions and outcomes. It also helps the Chair communicate effectively with the CEO -as the Chair develops an ability to share perspectives and alert the CEO to emerging interests and concerns.
Agenda management. Having the right discussion at the right time is important. Interviewees frequently recommended rigorous attention to management of the board's executive session time. Executive session discussions are highly valuable for important and sensitive issues. Chairs take time before the formal meeting to ensure that board members are informed on key issues and to identify the questions that needed to be covered.
Agenda management for the whole board session is also a critical arena for the non-executive Chair, and an area where he or she brings a unique contribution. Said one, Having a clear agenda management process is important because the agenda is best crafted by the CEO and Chair working together. Organizing the agenda should not be approached as a last minute exercise, and interviewees observed that, in their experience, last minute agenda planning did not work well. Some pairs met a week in advance to review the agenda; others kept an ongoing dialogue so that a preparation meeting was simply a confirmation of earlier discussions.
But all thought the CEO and Chair needed to be sure that the agenda is substantial and meaty-precious board meeting time should be spent in focus areas that are important and worth discussion. Many boards also look at agenda topics through the annual timeframe.
Problems arise when the agenda is not agreed upon -particularly when one party or the other feels important items get short shrift. Chairs identified one risk: without strong board guidance, agendas can become dominated with compliance and regulatory topics submitted by legal elements in management.
Major decisions. For decisions that come to the board, particularly those that come regularly, there should be a process. Without a process and overall framework, the board is stuck with a simple thumbs up/thumbs down decision.
One topic that arose frequently in interviews was the area of major acquisitions. For many growth companies, acquisitions are an integral part of strategy. Smaller companies may acquire two or three companies a year; a large Fortune 50 can acquire up to 20 companies a year. More generally, throughout the interviews, three specific decision areas emerged as needing good processes:
• Major transactions. Whether it be ongoing acquisitions, potential mergers, divestitures, or a sale of the company, it is best to manage it methodically. Particularly for activities that likely repeat, such as acquisitions, it should be managed as a process -not a one-off event. One company reviews the acquisition landscape (what competitors are doing; what companies might be targets) whether or not an acquisition is being proposed. This relieves the Chair-CEO relationship of the thumbs up/thumbs down decision and its fallout. It puts decisions in a framework that aids informed decision making for all. (See Building an Acquisition Process insert for one Chair's experience.)
• Compensation. Given the importance of this, as well as the scrutiny received from proxy advisors, this was an area where a clear process needed to be in place to ensure the board was involved.
• People. Chairs and CEOs had clear agreement about the division of roles with respect to corporate personnel: the CEO
In Their Own Words…
building an acquisition process "It began when a few directors who had a strong background in strategy started feeling uncomfortable with the number of acquisition proposals the board was getting. The company had seen several proposals -some big, some small, some similar to our business model, and some very different. We just felt we were behind the curve in understanding some pretty basic things, and the CEO seemed to feel it was all under control. We sponsored a research project to figure out how other boardsparticularly those for companies with active acquisition strategies -dealt with mergers and acquisitions. The benchmarking was useful -particularly in looking at different models for handling the topic -some used an executive committee, some had a special committee, a strategy committee, or a transactions committee. This made a lot of sense to us since some of us were better suited for the analytics around an acquisition, and it didn't make sense to drag the board through all the detail.
Another thing that helped was the framing -having the CEO put the acquisitions in a pipeline -starting with the opportunity space, to the fit assessment, to the qualifications -including due diligence, pricing and integration planning. Just having that map helped frame up the decisions we had to make.
Although we had to smooth things with the CEO, overall it worked well, and the board did a much better job overseeing acquisitions. Ironically, when the CEO left two years later, we heard from staff that this was one of the best things the board did." manages the people. At the same time, a board will be uncomfortable with a C-suite leader whom they lack confidence in. While it may not be the board's action item, directors will want to know that their concerns are heard and appropriate actions are taken. Here, relying on reciprocity and consideration, Chairs and CEOs do well to outline a process for dealing with different opinions on people, and agree on plans all can live with. (See Building the Management Team insert).
Leadership Transition Strategy.
Chairs pointed out that leadership transitions are particularly important -for the Chair-CEO relationship and also for the company. Relationships have a lifecycle. Where relationships are determined by roles with anticipated terms or contracts, the relationship can go through predictable cycles. Athletes anticipate movement to new levels -progress from one level to the next being expected. Changes in relationships effect outlook, performance as well as health and wellbeing -our own and those around us.
In professional settings, it is important to pay attention to changes in relationships. The change of a CEO or Chair represents a significant event in corporate leadership, and should be given sufficient attention to make sure the transition goes well. Poorly executed transitions stress the organization and create unnecessary costs and risks. Few responsibilities are as important and sensitive as the responsibility to ensure the company is well led and that leadership transitions are smooth.
Planning and managing CEO succession is a critical respon- In Their Own Words… aligning on strategy "In 2006, the industry was changing, and the financials told the story. There were different views among directors about the future of the company: some wanted to find a strategic buyer -a kind of financial exit; others felt the company should stay independent, believing a turnaround effort could restore the financial health and realize substantial shareholder value. As a Chairman, my challenge was to bring the board members together behind a unified strategy, despite distinctly different views.
We also had to hire a CEO. Once hired, the CEO found himself in the middle of the strategy fight. Clearly, he represented one strategy: the path of rebuilding the company and staying independent -that's what we hired him to do. The challenge for him was to figure out who was what side of the argument and why. Both of us had to spend one-on-one time with directors, understand their positions and thinking, what they saw in the situation, and try to bring those more to the center. For me, the challenge was bringing a group together; for him, the challenge was earning the trust of the people who had favored the financial exit strategy.
One thing that helped was the strategy process we used. It was step-by-step, methodical, and had three phases. We said, "Let's have a full understanding at each strategy juncture." That brought everyone along and built buy-in to the final decision. Management and the board worked very hard on it, but the transparency behind the strategy was critical: management didn't just present a baked strategy to approve. Eventually, the board got behind one strategy, but it took a time and effort. It came together over a six month period.
It was a real challenge for a new CEO coming into that environment, and the economic downturn made it even worse. But having worked through this together meant the board was behind the CEO. Of course, there's another point of view: some criticize the board for supporting the CEO given our performance. However, this board is not shy or acquiescent: we understand the criticism, but we also understand the options, and we stand behind the decisions.
I serve at the pleasure of my fellow board members, and I need to understand what's on their minds. When a director has a view that's different from where the majority of members are going, I try to understand their thinking. When we're on that topic in the boardroom, I focus on how to bring the issue up without getting personal, and how to encourage that director to come forth at the right time in the conversation. It can be really important to let someone else take the lead, let them lay their ideas out there, and have others react to the ideas. The Chair has to lead from the middle.
The days of a boardroom run by a celebrity CEO or a Chair who ramrods decisions through are gone. The transparency and trust between the board and management is invaluable. You can see the value of an aligned board. We need that alignment to be able to execute on decisions quickly, which is particularly important given the short time frames of our industry." In sum, a framework -including a common commitment, role clarity and good processes -is a key element for having a strong working relationship 14
iv. the enabling context
A Chair-CEO relationship works well when there is a supportive context-like having the right people around them -in place. Having a strong, supportive board; a competent and accessible management team; and a culture of openness reinforce the effective working relationship of the Chair-CEO.
Where the board has low support for management or for the Chair, anticipate problems. Where the management team sees the board as weak or overinvolved, that too will cause problems.
Of course, the context and the relationship are interdependent -the Chair and CEO can influence the board and management they have. Where support is not in place, it is the first order of business for the pair to understand the issues and to take action. There have been cases where the CEO and Chair worked together to rebuild the board, in some cases replacing all or most of the directors (see insert Repositioning the Company). Where there are issues with management, the two should work together to ensure they are addressed either by replacement, development, or role changes.
A Competent and Supportive Board.
Having a board with competent directors who know how to work together is, of course, a vital condition for the enterprise. It is also vital for the CEO and Chair relationship.
First, a board that understands the non-executive Chair role will channel discussion and activity appropriately -avoiding unnecessary conflict and miscommunications. Second, a strong board can organize to do work effectively -a good Audit Chair, Compensation Chair, and Nominating and Governance Chair will provide appropriate care to their domain of responsibility, allowing the Chair to focus on the full board areas. In total, the board works better. Third, the Chair and the CEO should regularly compare perspectives on the board and directors, with the Chair responsible for incorporating the information into the overall board development plan.
A Strong and Accessible Management Team.
There are key executives that can work closely with the CEO and the board -the General Counsel, the CFO, the Corporate Secretary and the head of Human Resources, key business leaders, among others. When these roles are staffed with competent people who work well together, it is an aid to board effectiveness and supports an effective Chair-CEO relationship. As discussed earlier, directors should talk to the senior team in formal and informal settings. Some boards have
In Their Own Words… repositioning the company "A few years ago, we had a really tough year -we dealt with an unsolicited bid from a corporate, a proxy fight with an activist investor, anti-trust issues and general disillusionment among employees and customers. And we spent a lot of time and energy analyzing the stock price. We knew down to the penny what drove value, because we had to make tough decisions in the interests of all shareholders. Throughout the year, the CEO and I worked closely -communicating daily. But there were things the CEO couldn't credibly do -he was too closely identified with the company. It fell to me to talk to investors about our willingness to negotiate.
All this led to a relook at the company's strategy, assets and structure. At the end of the year, the CEO and I discussed the structure going forward. I didn't have to say much -he said, "I know, we have to talk about my role." He could have done the CEO job easily, but media coverage had tarnished his ability to lead. The company is really fortunate that he was willing to stay in an advisory position-he's knowledgeable, well connected and he's a huge draw for talent. So we launched a search for a new CEO. The board had already done a good job identifying what needed to be done, and we needed someone who could credibly take the company in that direction. We looked inside but ended up taking on an outsider. We spent time together -I gave him the lay of the land, background on decisions, employees, and so forth. He said point blank: 'I have enough to do. I'll handle the company, you manage the board.' I knew what he meant.
I did just that. In light of the company's strategy, I looked at where the board was weak and strong. And there were some legacy directors that were no longer good fits. I just said matter-of-factly, 'We have to talk about your transition off the board.' Three directors (on the board via the activist investor) resigned in 2009. Another director did not stand for re-election and, after a search, we added three new directors including an audit partner from a big 4 firm, and two CEOs in the industry. The company is much better positioned to execute on its strategy now."
approved having the senior team join the regular board meeting and expect executives to contribute during board discussions.
Although Chairs usually report that the CEO is responsible for managing the executive team, when directors perceived problems in the management team, this is a red flag for the Chair. In one case, the board and the CEO disagreed about a senior management member. The board had a longstanding concern about one particular executive's effectiveness in position; the CEO acknowledged some weakness but defended the executive as effective to serve. Over time, the Chair and CEO collaborated on an evaluation of the individual in question -an important resolution to a conflict area that troubled the relationship early on. In another case, the board knew that rebuilding the team was required to achieve the business goals set forth, and the board was engaged in key compensation decisions (see insert Building the Management Team).
Where there are disagreements about the competency of an individual on the management team, the Chair and CEO will do well to raise it early and agree on a course of action.
The Right Culture.
Most corporations will have a distinctive culture. Often times that culture reflects the nature of the work itself -consumer goods companies will have a strong consumer, marketing, creative focus; oil rig builders may have an engineering culture with a focus on safety. But culture can be a real detriment to information getting through to the board. Chairs recognized the paramount importance of their role in culture -setting the tone at the top.
The tone at the top is reflected between the non-executive Chair and the CEO. Is there trust? Open communication? Not a lot of second guessing? (Non-executive Chair)
The recent BP oil spill has given some insight into the importance of culture to a company, its reputation, and its leadership. The culture -valuing cost savings over safety -is alleged to have been a contributor to the Maconda blowout and other BP accidents. The culture evidenced by BP leadership in the aftermath appeared equally damaging: perceptions that leadership was remote, disinterested, and unhelpful harmed BP's reputation as much as the spill did. And the board's role was unclear: although it was closely monitoring the situation, its actions received little media attention-leaving outsiders and many shareowners to wonder whether directors-and, in particular, BP's Chair-was adequately monitoring the CEO.
If anything, this event indicates the importance of considering culture as a critical contextual variable for the success of the Chair-CEO relationship.
1. Distinct Value of the Chair Role.
As with any role, the Chair role is delineated for the distinctive value it creates -for focus, expertise, activities and results.
The CEO role has been the subject of much research, writing and applied education. Major consulting firms have a CEO practice; business schools have CEO offerings. The contributions of CEOs are well studied, debated and documented.
The non-execuetive Chair role is relatively new on the scene in North America. It has also been studied, though not to the same degree as the CEO role. The non-execuetive Chair role, although increasingly frequent in the S&P 500, is still in less than half the major US firms. The Chairmen's Forum's 2009 paper Chairing the Board outlined Chair responsibilities, drawing on a broad array of research and writing. However, practice is not the same as research, and making the designated role real in practice can be a challenge. Guidelines are subject to interpretation, and specific work related events or decisions will likely involve both Chair and CEO roles. Thus, an effective relationship is likely to enable unique Chair contributions. An ineffective relationship -particularly one in which a new Chair is eclipsed or neutered by a dominant, role-comfortable CEO -will rob the company of the Chair's value and contribution.
The specific areas interviewees identified as where the Chair uniquely contributes are summarized below. For interviewees, by far the most important contribution of the Chair is to facilitate the board's voice, and to provide a point of accountability for the board. Another CEO emphasized the importance of managing the board, saying:
In Their Own Words… dealing with a short-term activist "We quickly realized that management's strategy was going nowhere -we were dealing with an exponential math that couldn't last. The company pursued a strategy of opening stores that had taken us to the lowest sales per square foot in our competitor group. They promised double digit margins, a rare occurrence in the retail industry. When they failed the stock fell to 10% of its peak value. This was what we had to clean up.
Given the harsh retailing environment, the board undertook a review of strategic alternatives including an outright sale. Shortly thereafter, the activist investor, who had cashed out at $24 a year earlier, was offering to buy the company back at $9, arguing that the store opening strategy was the right strategy. We had to take the offer seriously, because he was threatening a proxy fight, and $9 was twice the current trading range of the stock. We put together a thorough analysis showing that the [activist investor's] strategy was not sustainable, that the current leadership and board had the right skills, and that our strategy was sustainable over the long-term. We took our story to proxy advisors and to investors: and all of this is publicly available on the Edgar database.
In the end we prevailed, and put together a fair and impartial sales process. A year later, we sold the company for $17.40 -well over the activist's offer. And the company was in far better shape. Much of what we did had to be done by the Chair and the board, because even the new CEO was conflicted. At the same time, the new CEO brought expertise, and managed the company. We kept in close touch during the sales process, although of course he was excluded from the special committee when he entered negotiations with the buyer." One specific area where Chairs described their contribution was in investor communications, particularly where they felt the company's story had not been adequately told. One Chair offered the following narrative: Chairs did not universally see investor relations as part of their status quo role, most recognized that they could be called upon for investor communications should the need arise. The insert Dealing with a Short-Term Activist describes how one Chair specifically helped the firm, investors and shareholders. The common thread in this and other contributions is that, in certain instances, the Chair can communicate on a topic more credibly than the CEO. This set of responsibilities should be subject to mutual agreement and explicit review by the board. In several cases reviewed for this paper, there were distinct contributions by directors, facilitated by a Chair role. These were idiosyncratic -based on company need and Chair capability. For instance, one Chair helped the CEO build the business in Asia. In another case, a technical expert on the board reviewed some of the key technology strategies. In a different case, the Chair drove the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley governance regulations. These contributions were facilitated by the Chair managing the board and director engagement. While much of this might have happened without a Chair, the ability of the Chair-CEO partnership to ensure that all parties were of like mind made for productive outcomes.
Sometimes

Better Outcomes through Joint Decision
Processes.
CEOs and Chairs offered examples of where the joint efforts of the Chair and the CEO together with the board led to a better outcome for the firm and its shareholders. In a somewhat typical story, a non-executive Chair described how differences of opinion led to a better solution: Over the course of three intensive days, the board and management worked on the acquisition -investigating a broad array of risks, estimating returns and value. After intensive work, the acquisition continued to look troubling and the CEO himself suggested that the firm should not proceed with the effort. This turned out to be a prudent decision, and the process strengthened the board, management and their working relationship.
In another example, one Chair recognized that there were a few clumsy practices in the company's procurement process. This sometimes made it more complicated to explain certain capital expenditures to the board and other stakeholders. While not significant enough to call out as a red flag, the Chair thought it was important to address. As Chair, he brought the issue to the CEO -formulating the concern and suggesting a way forward. After several conversations, the CEO outlined a plan for improvement, which he presented to the board for approval.
These cases illustrate the importance to the "chemistry" aspect of reciprocity and consideration. Better outcomes were realized because the Chair and CEO worked well together.
The benefits would not have been realized had either forced a decision on the other.
More Engagement and Commitment.
The non-executive Chair role requires a significant commitment both in terms of share of mind and time. Interviewed Chairs acknowledge that they would do the work required regardless of their title (for instance, Lead Director versus Chair). As professionals, they will fulfill the duties determined by the role, the responsibilities and the circumstances. Some interviewed Chairs made a specific effort to indicate that they do not favor one leadership structure over another, said one, "I don't want to get into any debates about titles -title doesn't matter to me . "
Several interviewees noted that the Chair role has specific and clear responsibilities that may or may not be part of the lead director role. For instance, the Chair runs the meetingboth full meetings and executive sessions. The Lead Director may or may not run the meeting. There are prerogatives that more naturally go with the Chair title, and are therefore, more natural to take. Initiatives taken by the board leader are attributed to the Chair role, not to an aggressive director trying to over reach his influence. Thus, in taking initiative, the Chair is seen as fulfilling a professional duty not pursuing personal power.
Some Chairs felt that the title helps get work done. The title conveys responsibility. The conferred responsibility increases the attention paid to the Chair's insights and suggestions. Increased attention can increase understanding and ability of proposals. Better understanding and acceptance of leadership actions increases overall board effectiveness. 
vi. implications for action
The insights from the Chairs and CEOs are worth building on, and may be particularly useful for an emerging culture of independent board leadership. Chairs will undoubtedly be interested in what they can learn from the practices of their peers. In the spirit of sharing learning, there are some specific implications for action.
Clarify The Value Proposition of The Leadership Model.
The non-executive Chair is a recent development in the US corporate governance landscape. The premise -put forward by advocates -is that such a board leadership model can facilitate better decision making in service of long term shareholder value by providing clear and focused lines of accountability. The non-executive Chair can also be a unique thought partner to the CEO as the two fulfill their intertwined responsibilities to shareholders and other stakeholders.
An important caveat is that effective leadership structure is a one element in a suite of good practices -which include clear, frequent shareholder communications; reasonable and fair compensation practices; strong audit processes; a good board; and a good management team. Singling out leadership structure as the sole lynchpin for success is flawed logic. Safety belts don't prevent accidents from happening, but they certainly help contain injury when accidents do happen.
Therefore, in this paper and elsewhere, communications should underscore the value of this structure in context -as part of a framework of good governance practices.
Codify Norms and Practices.
There are details that can be addressed straightforwardly, and these could be more generally acknowledged and recommended. Throughout the document these have been highlighted, but are summarized and added to below: VIII. Chair and CEO turnover should be planned in consideration of each other: some felt that concurrent change was undesirable from the perspective of stability and continuity. The succession plans should be known to the board and reviewed annually.
3. Build Practical Knowledge and Capability.
Networks, conferences, education events, and publications that help non-executive Chairs and their CEOs build strong working relationships. Learning from the experience of others can allow newcomers to build capability more quickly. The UK Chairmen's Forum, for instance, matches non-executive Chairs new to their role with experienced Chairs, who serve as mentors. Also, discourse can allow standards to emerge more quickly, and while each pair is unique, where they can refer to commonly accepted practices, there is less need to hash out new approaches, and less room for contention and conflict on less important topics.
The CEO role receives substantial attention -from the company, the board, investors, and the media. As outlined earlier, the CEO role and its counterpart C-suite roles are studied, analyzed, evaluated, and thoroughly examined by a broad au- CEO did lead to observable value (see Table 1 ).
In case stories, a strong relationship matters most under two types of conditions:
• Repositioning the company: due to any number of circumstances and causes, the company suffers reputation and market capitalization damage; the company needs to be repositioned which may include strategy review and adjustment, executive changes, increased communications to investors, analysts, employees and press. It also often involved appropriate (re)valuation and communication of such to markets. In one case, the strong Chair-CEO relationship undoubtedly contributed to the company's ability to keep mission-critical talent.
• Major asset decisions: whether continuous as in an acquisition/string-of-pearls growth strategy, or a major merger of equals, the Chair-CEO relationship allowed the board with management to manage key decision outcomes such as brand selections, market presence, leverage, risk, and so forth. Across these many stories and lives, three major themes of "working relationship" emerge: relationship chemistry, helpful framework, supportive context. These areas and the related practices are outlined in Figure 1 . Table 1 ). TABLE 1 chair-ceo relationship framework figure 1
CHAIR -CEO RELATIONSHIP FRAMEWORK
21
Thus, Chairs and CEOs who foresee these types of challenges on the horizon would do well to pressure-test the strength of the working relationship. Specifically, it might be worthwhile for Chair-CEO pairs to do a quick checklist on how they assess the relationship, framework, context and results (see Appendix provided).
Clearly a strong working relationship is essential when the company is in crises, facing major transitions in strategy and leadership. Crisis tends to generate more demands on the organization and more work for leadership -creating a pressing need for all hands on deck as, clearly, there is much work to be done. These strong relationships are also helpful, even essential, during times of transition -a new CEO, a new Chair, a sale, an acquisition. They can also be helpful in steady-state circumstances. As many Chairs and CEOs noted: it is best to build a strong relationship before you need it.
Comments on this report are welcome and should be directed to elise.walton@gmail.com.
viii. about the author, the chairmen's forum, and the millstein center The Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance at the Yale School of Management is a leading global resource for testing, challenging and advancing the premise that corporations should and can serve society. The Center pursues its mission by convening events; sponsoring empirical research; generating policy briefings; building market capacity by developing training, databases and institutions; and teaching and student interaction.
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Founded on February 26, 2008, the Chairmen's Forum is an organization comprised of non-executive Chairs of corporate boards whose companies are incorporated and stocks are traded on exchanges in the United States and Canada. Participants meet for the purpose of addressing steps that enhance the accountability of corporations to owners, discussing matters of common interest, promoting deeper understanding of independent board leadership practices and reaching out to the wider market on effective practices of board chairmanship. The Chairmen's Forum intends to help create an international hub of national and regional forums of non-executive Chairs to encourage peer exchanges worldwide.
The Forum regularly prepares briefing documents that explore important, timely issues and practical solutions in the field of corporate governance. Past briefings have explored global trends in corporate governance, practices that improve board independence, the role of the non-executive board Chair, among others. The Forum sponsors research and briefings to add to the public discourse on corporate governance among a broad group of stakeholders, and hopes that increased transparency and knowledge will help restore market trust. Briefings are reviewed by Stephen Davis, Executive Director of the Millstein Center, and a small group of advisors; however, briefings represent the research and opinion of the author, not those of the Center or the University. 
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